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O P I N I O N 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Gunawan Liem, an Indonesian national, petitions for 
review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings.  Although these motions are disfavored, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) is still required to 
meaningfully consider the evidence and arguments presented 
by a petitioner and must explain its conclusions.  Because the 
BIA failed to do so in this case, we will grant Liem’s petition 
for review, vacate the order denying his motion to reopen, and 
remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
A. 
 Liem is a native and citizen of Indonesia.  He is also 
ethnically Chinese and a practicing Seventh Day Adventist 
Christian, making him a member of two minority groups in his 
country of origin.  While in Indonesia, Liem witnessed and 
experienced persecution based on his belonging to these 
groups.1  As a result, he sought refuge in the United States and, 
                                              
1 Liem has alleged three specific instances of persecution:  
First, he witnessed “Muslims . . . taking over the town [he] 
lived in” and “burning down Christian churches.”  AR 75.  
Second, his father, who conducted business buying and selling 
jewelry, was accused of having purchased stolen jewelry.  
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in 1999, was granted a six-month visa for vacationing.  He 
stayed beyond the expiration of his visa and established a life 
here by obtaining gainful employment, marrying his wife, and 
fathering two American-born children.  Most notably for our 
purposes, he has been an active congregant of his local church, 
the First Indonesian Seventh-Day Adventist Church, and has 
also served the church as a deacon. 
 
 In 2003, approximately four years after entering the 
United States, Liem filed an application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations 
implementing the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”).  
The Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) denied his application for 
asylum as untimely but granted withholding of removal.  
Although the IJ expressed some doubt as to whether Liem 
would be in “direct danger” if he returned to Indonesia, he 
resolved the issue in favor of Liem because he “[was] not 
willing to take any chances at th[e] moment and . . . [Liem] 
[wa]s asking only for temporary protection.”  AR 832–33.  The 
Government appealed, and the BIA vacated the IJ’s ruling 
because Liem “failed to meet his burden of proof to establish 
that there is a clear probability that he would be persecuted if 
returned to Indonesia.”  AR 770.  Accordingly, the BIA 
ordered Liem removed to Indonesia.  Liem did not petition for 
review of that order.  Instead, he filed a motion to stay his 
removal and reopen the proceedings, referencing a continued 
“pattern of anti-Chinese harassment and persecution [and] . . . 
                                              
Liem claims that the police did not find his father credible 
because he was Chinese.  Third, a mob attacked Liem on his 
way home from work because of his Chinese ethnicity.  The 
mob forced him out of his car, took his wallet, and physically 
assaulted him. 
 5 
 
a pattern of anti-Christian persecution.”  AR 634.  The BIA 
denied this motion, citing U.S. State Department findings of a 
decrease in discrimination against Chinese Christians in 
Indonesia.  Liem petitioned this Court for review of that order, 
and we denied his petition.  Liem v. Att’y Gen., 280 F. App’x 
206, 209 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).2 
 
 In early 2018, ICE agents arrested Liem and initiated 
the process of removing him to Indonesia.  Liem filed a second 
motion to reopen his removal proceedings, this time claiming 
that, since the time of his merits hearing in 2003, conditions for 
Chinese Christians had materially deteriorated to an extent 
warranting reopening, despite the temporal and numerical 
limitations on motions to reopen.3  In his motion, Liem urged 
that various international agencies “have reported that the level 
of hatred and Islamic extremism directed at Indonesian 
Christians on the grassroots level is rising, and the government 
of Indonesia is unwilling to act for fear of reprisals from the 
far-right Islamist groups.”  AR 31.  He also highlighted, among 
other things, Indonesia’s laws prohibiting blasphemy, which 
are markedly ambiguous and have been used against religious 
minorities, as well as the implementation of Sharia law in part 
of the country.  Liem supported his claim of materially changed 
                                              
2 We held that we lacked jurisdiction to consider Liem’s 
arguments that challenged the BIA’s earlier vacating of his 
withholding of removal, since he did not directly petition for 
review of that order.  Liem, 280 F. App’x at 209.  We also 
rejected his due process claim and his argument that the BIA 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.  Id. 
3 Liem also urged that his CAT claim was never adjudicated 
because his prior counsel was ineffective.  Because this claim 
is not featured in his petition for review, we will not address it. 
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country conditions with numerous exhibits4 and referenced 
several specifically in his motion to reopen.5 
                                              
4 Those exhibits, totaling about 190 pages, are as follows: 
 Exhibit II: Indonesian Christian whipped for selling 
sharia-banned booze, Channel NewsAsia (Jan. 19, 
2018) (describing public whipping of Christian man for 
selling illegal alcohol);  
 Exhibit JJ: Michael Levenson, For judge, these 
immigrants in US are like Jews fleeing Nazis, Boston 
Globe (Jan. 18, 2018) (describing district court opinion 
staying deportation of approximately fifty Indonesian 
Christians);  
 Exhibit KK: U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, Indonesia Travel Advisory (Apr. 17, 2017) 
(instructing travelers to “[e]xercise increased caution in 
Indonesia due to terrorism” (emphasis omitted));  
 Exhibit LL: Amnesty International, Indonesia, Amnesty 
International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s 
Human Rights (2017) (describing, among other things, 
Indonesia’s blasphemy laws and use of caning as a 
punishment);  
 Exhibit MM: Human Rights Watch, Indonesia, World 
Report 2017 (2017) (summarizing, among other things, 
treatment of religious minorities in Indonesia);  
 Exhibit NN: Matt Ozug & Ari Shapiro, ‘It’s Our Right’: 
Christian Congregation In Indonesia Fights To 
Worship In Its Church, NPR (Nov. 1, 2017) (reporting 
on ongoing fourteen-year struggle to open a single 
church);  
 Exhibit OO: Andreas Harsono, Indonesia Sends 
Ominous Signal to Religious Minorities, Human Rights 
Watch (Sept. 25, 2017) (reporting that Indonesia has not 
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repealed “ambiguous” blasphemy laws despite 
recommendation from United Nations to do so);  
 Exhibit PP: James Hookway, Curfews, Obligatory 
Prayers, Whippings: Hard-Line Islam Emerges in 
Indonesia; Conservative Islamic groups are using 
political activism and charity work to build wide 
support for Shariah-inspired laws, Wall St. J. (Sept. 13, 
2017) (detailing conservative Islamic groups’ rise to 
power in Indonesia);  
 Exhibit QQ: Ben Bland, Indonesia’s Chinese 
population fears rising ethnic tensions – Old wounds 
reopen in Muslim-majority nation as politicians and 
radicals stoke hostility, Fin. Times (Aug. 14, 2017) 
(reporting increasing hostility against Chinese);  
 Exhibit RR: Ryan Dagur, Indonesian Muslims accuse 
Christian lawmaker of blasphemy, UCA News (Aug. 
11, 2017) (describing blasphemy accusations leveled 
against Christian politician Victor Laiskodat);  
 Exhibit SS: Andreas Harsono, The Toxic Impact of 
Indonesia’s Abusive Blasphemy Law, Human Rights 
Watch (Aug. 5, 2017) (detailing history and current use 
of Indonesia’s blasphemy law);  
 Exhibit TT: Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Indonesia: 
Visit Report 10-23 May 2017 (2017) (detailing 
deterioration of “Indonesia’s tradition of religious 
pluralism”);  
 Exhibit UU: Joe Cochrane, Governor of Jakarta 
Withdraws Appeal of Blasphemy Sentence, N.Y. Times 
(May 23, 2017) (describing conviction of Christian 
governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as 
“Ahok”) of blasphemy and the public’s response to 
conviction);  
 8 
 
                                              
 Exhibit VV: UN experts urge Indonesia to free jailed 
politicians, repeal its blasphemy law, UN News Centre 
(May 22, 2017) (reporting that United Nations human 
rights experts urged Indonesian government to repeal 
blasphemy law and release Ahok);  
 Exhibit WW: Olivia Tasevski, Anti-Chinese and anti-
Christian sentiment is not new in Indonesia, The 
Conversation (May 17, 2017) (describing Ahok’s 
conviction and Indonesia’s history of discrimination 
against Christians and Chinese);  
 Exhibit XX: Indonesia Islam: Governor’s blasphemy 
conviction divides a nation, BBC (May 9, 2017) 
(reporting on Ahok’s conviction and public’s response); 
 Exhibit YY: U.S. Comm’n Int’l Religious Freedom, 
2017 Annual Report: Indonesia (Apr. 2017) (reporting 
Commission’s findings on treatment of religious 
minorities in Indonesia); 
 Exhibit ZZ: Religion, power and politics in Indonesia, 
BBC (Apr. 20, 2017) (explaining role of religion in 
Indonesian politics);  
 Exhibit AAA: Yenni Kwok, Conservative Islam Has 
Scored a Disquieting Victory in Indonesia’s Normally 
Secular Politics, Time (Apr. 20, 2017) (describing ways 
in which religion emerged in 2017 election for Jakarta’s 
governor);  
 Exhibit BBB: Safrin La Batu, Jokowi accused of 
promoting secularism, Jakarta Post (Mar. 27, 2017) 
(reporting negative backlash received by Indonesian 
president after call for separation of religion and 
politics);  
 Exhibit CCC: Ahok trial: The blasphemy case testing 
Indonesian identity, BBC (Feb. 14, 2017) (describing 
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“rising trend of conservativism” and increased 
intolerance towards religious minorities and Chinese in 
context of Ahok’s trial for blasphemy);  
 Exhibit DDD: Jakarta vote: Indonesia hardliners call 
for Muslim governor, BBC (Feb. 11, 2017) (reporting 
on Indonesian Muslims’ campaign against Ahok);  
 Exhibit EEE: Sana Jaffrey, Justice by numbers, New 
Mandala (Jan. 12, 2017) (reporting on increase in 
vigilantism in Indonesia);  
 Exhibit FFF: Firm action needed to curb growing 
intolerance: Wahid Foundation, Jakarta Post (Dec. 23, 
2016) (summarizing Wahid Foundation report on 
increased intolerance and radicalism in Indonesia); 
 Exhibit GGG: Indonesian scholars stand up against 
growing intolerance, Jakarta Post (Dec. 23, 2016) 
(reporting on Indonesian scholars’ response to growing 
intolerance);  
 Exhibit HHH: Margareth S. Aritonang, Indonesians 
increasingly blame the weak: Scholar, Jakarta Post 
(Dec. 22, 2016) (reporting on “growing trend of 
discriminating against the country’s minorities and 
marginalized communities”);  
 Exhibit III: Marguerite Afra Sapiie, Indonesian Police 
assert control over MUI fatwas, Jakarta Post (Dec. 21, 
2016) (describing police involvement in dissemination 
of fatwas);  
 Exhibit JJJ: Azis Anwar Fachrudin, INSIGHT: Politics 
of Muslim identity over Santa outfits, Jakarta Post (Dec. 
20, 2016) (detailing 2016 fatwa barring Muslims from 
wearing “non-Muslim religious attributes” and 
explaining ways in which it is more extreme than past 
Christmas fatwas);  
 10 
 
 The BIA, in a single member opinion, denied the motion 
to reopen.  In this opinion, after noting the standard for granting 
                                              
 Exhibit KKK: Indonesian protests awaken fears, 
Associated Press (Dec. 2, 2016) (describing movement 
against Ahok and how it has sparked increased 
intolerance of Christians and Chinese);  
 Exhibit LLL: Indonesia protest: Jakarta anti-governor 
rally turns violent, BBC (Nov. 4, 2016) (reporting on 
outbreaks of violence at anti-Ahok rallies);  
 Exhibit MMM: Nivell Rayda, Survey Reveals Worrying 
Religious Conservatism Among High School Students, 
Jakarta Globe (May 25, 2016) (reporting findings on 
study investigating religious conservativism of high 
school students);  
 Exhibit NNN: Robert P. George & Hannah Rosenthal, 
Rampant religious persecution against atheists: Robert 
P. George, USA Today (May 3, 2016) (noting use of 
Indonesia’s blasphemy law against atheist);  
 Exhibit OOO: Jonathan Emont, Islamist Intolerance 
Poses a Growing Threat to Indonesia’s Minorities, 
Time (Apr. 20, 2016) (describing violence perpetrated 
by Indonesian Muslims against minorities);  
 Exhibit PPP: Mike Thomson, Is Indonesia winning its 
fight against Islamic extremism?, BBC (Dec. 19, 2015) 
(describing extreme increase in visibility of 
conservative Islam in Indonesia); and  
 Exhibit QQQ: Church relocation threatens pluralism: 
GKI Yasmin, Jakarta Post (Dec. 7, 2015) (reporting on 
attempted government relocation of a church). 
5 In his motion, Liem cites to Exhibit II, Exhibit KK, Exhibit 
LL, Exhibit MM, Exhibit NN, Exhibit OO, Exhibit PP, Exhibit 
QQ, Exhibit RR, and Exhibit SS. 
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untimely and number-barred motions to reopen, it concluded—
without explanation—that Liem “offers little comparison 
between the country conditions or circumstances in 2003 and 
the current conditions or circumstances.”  A. 1.  The BIA 
stated: 
 
In any event, the respondent has 
not shown material changes in 
country conditions or 
circumstances in Indonesia since 
either 2003 or 2015/2016.  The 
Department of State’s 2016 
Indonesia International Religious 
Freedom Report shows that the 
constitution of Indonesia 
guarantees freedom of religion and 
the right to worship according to 
one’s own beliefs but allows the 
government to impose some legal 
restrictions.[]  The articles and 
reports submitted by the 
respondent show that 
discrimination and violence 
against minority religions continue 
to exist in Indonesia; blasphemy 
laws have not been repealed 
despite recommendations by 
United Nations, but are still being 
enforced; and some Christian 
churches have problems with local 
governments and communities in 
connection with building 
relocation.  However, the 
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documents also show that these 
conditions have been a 
longstanding problem in 
Indonesia, rather than materially 
changed conditions or 
circumstances (Motion Exhs. LL, 
MM-OO, SS, WW, YY).  The 
respondent argues that the “recent 
enactment” of blasphemy laws 
target the Christian minority 
(Motion at 8).  However, the 
evidence submitted shows that 
blasphemy laws were enacted in 
1965 and the threat of blasphemy 
law is “nothing new” (Motion Exh. 
SS at 2).  The respondent also 
argues that Indonesia’s Chinese 
population fears rising ethnic 
tensions (Motion at 9).  However, 
ethnic tensions have existed since 
Indonesia’s independence, and 
ethnic tensions against Chinese 
minorities have flared up into 
violent outbursts periodically since 
the country’s independence 
(Motion Exh. QQ). 
 
A. 1–2.  Based on this, the BIA concluded that Liem did “not 
show[] that conditions or circumstances in Indonesia changed 
materially, such that his motion falls within the motion to 
reopen time and number limitations” and denied his motion as 
untimely.  A. 2.  This petition for review followed. 
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B. 
 Shortly after the BIA denied Liem’s second motion to 
reopen and while this petition was pending, the First Circuit 
issued a precedential opinion in a factually related case, 
Sihotang v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2018).  There, the 
petitioner, an evangelical Christian from Indonesia, filed a 
motion to reopen his 2006 removal proceedings.  Id. at 48–49.  
The BIA denied his motion “[i]n a terse one-and-a-half page 
opinion.”  Id. at 49.  The First Circuit granted the petition and 
vacated and remanded because “the BIA’s analysis [was] 
superficial.”  Id. at 50.  The Court explained: 
 
In his motion to reopen, the 
petitioner asserted—and the 
government did not dispute—that 
the petitioner subscribes to a more 
particularized subset of the 
Christian faith: he is an evangelical 
Christian, for whom public 
proselytizing is a religious 
obligation.  Yet, in terms of the 
prospect of persecution arising out 
of changed country conditions, the 
BIA wholly failed to evaluate 
whether and to what extent there is 
a meaningful distinction between 
Christians who practice their faith 
in private and evangelical 
Christians (such as the petitioner), 
for whom public proselytizing is a 
central tenet.  So, too, the BIA 
neglected to consider whether 
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country conditions had materially 
changed with respect to public and 
private reactions (including 
vigilante violence) toward 
evangelical Christians.  Finally, 
the BIA neglected to consider 
whether attitudes in Indonesia had 
materially changed with respect to 
persons making public religious 
statements. 
 
Id. at 50–51.  The First Circuit concluded that this error was 
not harmless because “[t]he record [wa]s replete with copious 
new evidence submitted by the petitioner and unavailable in 
2006, which might well serve to ground a finding (or at least a 
reasonable inference) that country conditions have steadily 
deteriorated over the past twelve years.”  Id. at 51.  In this vein, 
the Court detailed facts reflected in the evidence that the BIA 
“completely overlooked.”  Id.  Many of these facts applied to 
evangelical and non-evangelical Christians alike, including the 
enactment of Sharia legislation in 2008, the prevention of 
thousands of Christians from attending Easter mass in 2010 by 
Muslim extremists and the local government, and demands 
from over 1,500 Muslims that a Christian found guilty of 
blasphemy be executed in 2011.  Id. at 51–52.  The Court 
specifically noted the increased “Islamic fundamentalist 
fervor” that might put evangelical Christians “at special risk in 
Indonesia” and distinguished this case from prior cases 
because of the “especially sharp increase in governmental and 
private persecution of Indonesian Christians between 2014 and 
2017—a period not under review in any of [our] prior cases.”  
Id. at 51, 53. 
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 In the wake of Sihotang, the same member of the BIA 
who denied the motion to reopen that is the subject of this 
petition issued at least eight unpublished decisions granting 
reopening of removal proceedings for Indonesian Christians.  
See ADD 1–17.  One of these decisions is within our circuit.  
See ADD 16 (Newark, NJ).  In each decision, that member 
determined that conditions in Indonesia had materially 
changed from a period starting between 2004 and 2009 and 
ending in 2018.  And although the member cited to Sihotang in 
at least seven of these opinions, none of them appear to hinge 
on whether the movant was an evangelical Christian or a 
Christian who practices privately.  Instead, the BIA concluded 
generally that “conditions confronting Christians in Indonesia 
have deteriorated and intensified between [the movants’] prior 
hearing[s] . . . and the filing of [their] motion[s to reopen] 
. . . .”  ADD 8; accord ADD 16–17. 
 
II. 
 The BIA had jurisdiction over Liem’s motion to reopen 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction over his petition 
for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the denial 
of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and will not 
disturb the BIA’s decision “unless it is found to be arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 
271 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 
(3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  We also give deference to the BIA’s evidentiary 
findings, id. at 272, and will uphold them if they are supported 
by substantial evidence, Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Nonetheless, as we discuss more fully below, 
the BIA has a heightened duty “to explicitly consider any 
country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that 
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materially bears on his claim.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 
260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
III. 
 We begin our analysis by reviewing the legal principles 
at play.  Then, we proceed to the merits of Liem’s claim. 
A. 
 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) 
require that motions to reopen removal proceedings be filed 
within ninety days of the date of entry of the final order 
concluding the proceeding to be reopened, and they limit a 
party to one motion to reopen.  However, these temporal and 
numerical limitations do not apply where a petitioner moves  
 
[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or 
withholding of deportation based 
on changed circumstances arising 
in the country of nationality or in 
the country to which deportation 
has been ordered, if such evidence 
is material and was not available 
and could not have been 
discovered or presented at the 
previous hearing. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Because Liem’s motion to reopen 
at issue in this case falls under this provision, he was required 
to provide evidence of materially changed conditions in 
Indonesia from the time of his merits hearing in 2003 to the 
time of his latest reopening hearing in 2018.  See Zhu, 744 F.3d 
at 278. 
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 In reviewing Liem’s second motion to reopen, the BIA 
was obliged to “meaningfully consider[] the evidence and 
arguments [Liem] presented.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The BIA 
did not have to “expressly parse each point or discuss each 
piece of evidence presented,” but it could not ignore evidence 
favorable to Liem.  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “To [show that it] fulfill[ed] this requirement, the 
BIA must [have] provide[d] an indication that it considered 
such evidence, and if the evidence is rejected, an explanation 
as to why it was rejected.”  Id. 
 
 We have acknowledged the “inherent tension” between 
the necessity of the BIA to indicate that it has considered all of 
the evidence while not needing to expressly parse or discuss 
each piece of evidence.  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268.  Nevertheless, 
and as noted above, the BIA has “a duty to explicitly consider 
any country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that 
materially bears on his claim.”  Id. (quoting Guo v. Gonzales, 
463 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This duty is heightened for motions to reopen based 
on changed country conditions.  See id. (citations omitted). 
 
 Several of our precedential opinions elaborate on the 
nature of this scrutiny.  Two cases in which we vacated BIA 
denials of untimely and number-barred motions to reopen are 
particularly relevant.  The first, Zheng v. Attorney General, 
involved two petitions for review of these denials.  Id. at 261.  
In the case of the first petitioner, we identified two errors in the 
BIA’s opinion:  First, the BIA “did little more than quote 
passages from [an] earlier decision . . . without identifying—
let alone discussing—the various statements contained in the 
record before it . . . .”  Id. at 268.  Second, the BIA failed to 
discuss most of the evidence presented by that petitioner.  Id.  
 18 
 
We also noted that the Eleventh Circuit had come to a contrary 
conclusion about the content of some of the same documents 
presented as evidence in a factually similar case.  Id. at 269.  
As to the second petitioner, we determined that the BIA’s terse 
explanation of its decision “amount[ed] to a series of 
conclusory statements” and faulted the BIA for its failure to 
discuss most of the evidence submitted and its failure to 
explain why that evidence was insufficient to show materially 
changed country conditions.  Id. at 270–71.  We granted the 
petitions for review, vacated the BIA’s orders, and remanded 
for the BIA to rectify these procedural deficiencies.  Id. at 272. 
 
 In Zhu v. Attorney General, our most recent 
precedential opinion addressing this issue, we vacated the 
BIA’s order for two reasons:  First, the BIA did not 
demonstrate that it had examined and considered all of the 
evidence presented by the petitioner by either failing to address 
certain evidence entirely or failing to explain why it rejected 
other evidence.  Id. at 274–76.  Second, the BIA ignored 
statements in reports to which it cited that supported the 
petitioner’s position, and failed to discuss why it found those 
statements unpersuasive but others in the same reports 
persuasive.  Id. at 277–78.  We concluded that “the BIA failed 
to ‘announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a 
reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and 
not merely reacted.’”  Id. at 278 (quoting Ni v. Holder, 715 
F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 2013)).  Accordingly, we granted the 
petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for 
full consideration of all of the evidence presented.  Id. at 279. 
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B. 
 We now turn to Liem’s claim.  Liem urges that the BIA 
abused its discretion by, first, selectively citing to the record in 
concluding that he failed to show a material change in country 
conditions and, second, by failing to meaningfully consider 
other evidence that supports his position. 
 
 The BIA cited to seven of the thirty-five exhibits 
submitted by Liem in support of his claim of materially 
changed country conditions.  Based on those seven exhibits, 
but without even a cursory review or description of them, it 
determined that “conditions [for Chinese Christians] have been 
a longstanding problem . . . in Indonesia, rather than materially 
changed conditions or circumstances.”  A. 2 (citing Emergency 
Stay of Removal and Mot. to Reopen Exhs. LL, MM-OO, SS, 
WW, YY).  Instead of explaining how it reached this 
conclusion, in the remainder of its opinion, the BIA quibbled 
with a factual inaccuracy in Liem’s motion and dismissed 
rising ethnic tensions against Chinese as one of many periodic 
flare-ups that have occurred in Indonesia since it gained its 
independence.  “[A]s a result, the BIA failed to ‘announce its 
decision in terms sufficient to enable [us] to perceive that it has 
heard and thought and not merely reacted.’”  Zhu, 744 F.3d at 
278 (quoting Ni, 715 F.3d at 631).  Even if the BIA reached the 
correct conclusion, its failure to explain why Liem’s evidence 
did not show materially changed conditions constituted an 
abuse of discretion.  See id. 
 
 Moreover, three of the seven exhibits cited by the BIA 
contain statements contrary to its conclusion.  First, Exhibit LL 
explains that caning “was applied to non-Muslims for the first 
time in April [of 2016] when a Christian woman received 28 
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strokes of the cane for selling alcohol.”6  AR 413 (emphasis 
added).  Second, Exhibit NN discusses “Indonesia’s growing 
intolerance” of religious minorities, focusing specifically on 
Christians.  AR 430 (emphasis added).  Notably, that exhibit 
states that approximately 1,000 churches have been shut down 
in Indonesia between 2007 and 2017,7 and that a church 
permitting effort that “start[ed] in 2003” has stalled.  AR 427, 
431; see also AR 428 (discussing government defiance of an 
Indonesia Supreme Court decision favoring the church 
permitting).  Lastly, Exhibit YY asserts that “by many 
accounts, violations of the freedom of religion or belief 
continue to rise and/or increase in intensity, and experts believe 
many incidents go unreported.”  AR 491.  That exhibit also 
discusses the recent discriminatory use of a 2006 regulation 
requiring houses of worship to gain certain community support 
before obtaining a permit for them to be built.  Fundamentalist 
Islamic groups have been exploiting this regulation to justify 
the closing of existing places of worship and to prevent the 
opening of new ones.  AR 493.8   Therefore, much like the BIA 
                                              
6Exhibit II, which was not cited by the BIA but was cited by 
Liem in his motion, reports that, since this occurrence, caning 
has been applied to non-Muslims twice more. 
7This number is particularly striking when compared with the 
closing of only 516 churches between 1945 and 1998.  See AR 
1007. 
8 The Government contends that Exhibit YY, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2017 
Report, shows that Indonesia’s conditions have not materially 
changed over the relevant time period because the Commission 
has listed Indonesia as a “Tier 2” country since 2004.  We 
reject this argument for three reasons:  First, the BIA did not 
adopt this reasoning below, and “[w]e are bound to review the 
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in Zhu, the BIA in this case ignored statements in exhibits to 
which it cited that support Liem’s position, and it failed to 
explain why it found these statements unpersuasive and others 
in the same exhibits persuasive.  Zhu, 744 F.3d at 277–78; see 
also Ni, 715 F.3d at 627 (“Why the BIA found the Reports’ 
discussion of certain ‘administrative punishments’ and 
coercive tactics to be persuasive, but found the Reports’ 
discussion of forced sterilizations and abortions in Fujian 
Province not to be persuasive, however, remains a mystery.”). 
 
 The shortcomings of the BIA’s opinion do not end here.  
In addition to these deficiencies, the BIA failed to even 
mention the vast majority of the exhibits submitted by Liem.  
(There are twenty-eight uncited and unmentioned exhibits, to 
be exact.)  Many of the unaddressed exhibits provide support 
for his contention that conditions in Indonesia have materially 
                                              
agency’s decision based solely on the stated grounds for that 
decision.”  Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 122 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Second, 2004 is not the relevant year of comparison, since 
Liem’s most recent merits hearing occurred in 2003.  Third, we 
doubt that proving material change requires that a country 
move from Tier 2 to Tier 1, or “countries of particular 
concern.”  U.S. Comm’n Int’l Religious Freedom, 2017 
Annual Report 3 (2017).  The Commission defines Tier 2 
countries as those whose religious freedom violations meet one 
or two of these elements: (1) systematic, (2) ongoing, or (3) 
egregious.  Id.  Tier 1 countries are those whose violations meet 
all three elements.  Id.  Therefore, a country like Indonesia can 
maintain Tier 2 status even though its religious freedom 
violations worsen either (a) by fulfilling only one element to 
fulfilling two, or (b) by barely meeting an element (or two) to 
definitively doing so. 
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changed since 2003.  A number of them generally reference 
Indonesia’s “growing trend of discriminating against the 
country’s minorities and marginalized communities.”  AR 542 
(emphasis added); see also AR 443 (addressing the “rising 
intolerance” against Chinese Indonesians (emphasis added)).  
For example, contrary to the BIA’s assertion that “the 
constitution of Indonesia guarantees freedom of religion and 
the right to worship according to one’s own beliefs,” A. 1, 
Exhibit TT states that “[i]n recent years Indonesia’s strong and 
proud pluralistic tradition [of freedom of religion or belief], 
rooted in the heart of the constitution, has come under threat,” 
AR. 458 (emphasis added).9  That same exhibit reports that in 
2017, “the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights 
. . . published a report detailing a steady increase in [freedom 
of religion or belief] violations in recent years.”  AR 459 
                                              
9  We remind the BIA that its duty to not cherry-pick evidence 
extends to State Department country reports.  See Berishaj v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that the BIA 
must “address the relevant country report in some detail”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Nbaye v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 
57 (3d Cir. 2011).  Here, the BIA took administrative notice of 
the State Department’s 2016 Indonesia International Religious 
Freedom Report to describe Indonesia’s constitution and the 
government’s power “to impose some legal restrictions” on 
religion.  A. 1–2, n. 1.  But the BIA ignored facts from the 
report that suggest a rising intolerance against Christians.  See, 
e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 
International Religious Freedom Report: Indonesia 1, 8 (2016) 
(documenting blasphemy charges against Jakarta governor 
Ahok and the caning that marked “the first time a non-Muslim 
was punished under Aceh’s special [S]haria-based law”). 
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(emphasis added).   Other exhibits offer more specific 
illustrations of changes, including the following: 
 
 Exhibit PP, a Wall Street Journal article, details the rise 
of “[h]ard-line Islamic groups,” including the Islamic 
Defenders Front (known in Indonesia as the “FPI”).  
AR 438.  The article explains that the FPI “stepped into 
the national scene in the mid-2000s” and has since 
gained significant influence over Indonesian politicians 
and their constituents.  AR 440.  “In recent years, 
lobbying groups such as the [FPI] have helped 
introduce more than 400 Sharia[]-inspired laws . . . , 
including those that penalize adultery, force women to 
wear headscarves and restrict them from going out at 
night.”  AR 438.  In addition, the FPI “successfully 
lobbied Indonesia’s Supreme Court in 2013 to overrule 
the government and allow local authorities to restrict 
sales of alcohol, arguing it was eating away at 
traditional Islamic values.”  AR 440.  As of 2017, the 
group maintained offices in thirty of the thirty-four 
Indonesian provinces and had conducted extensive 
outreach through, among other things, prayer rallies 
and charitable projects.  The article provides that, 
through this “strong presence” in the community, the 
FPI has been able to achieve great political power 
because, as one interviewee put it, “[t]he politicians 
don’t have much choice but to follow.”  AR 440 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  It concludes with a 
timeline detailing the rise of the FPI from 1998 to 2016.  
Most notably, at the time of Liem’s merits hearing in 
2003, the founder of the FPI was imprisoned “for 
inciting his followers to smash up bars and other 
entertainment venues the FPI deem[ed] immoral.”  AR 
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441.  By 2015 and 2016, however, the group had 
effectuated a national ban on alcohol sales at 
convenience stores and “accuse[d] Jakarta’s Christian 
governor . . . of blasphemy, setting off a series of mass 
protests that ultimately led to the governor’s defeat in 
his re-election bid [that] year,” id., and his conviction 
and imprisonment for blasphemy. 
 A number of exhibits address the blasphemy conviction 
and imprisonment of the former governor of Jakarta, 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as “Ahok”).  
Ahok, a Chinese Christian, became a governor by 
succession, not election.  In a speech during his 2016 
campaign to be elected in his own right for a successive 
term, he cited a passage from the Quran to persuade 
Muslims that voting for a non-Muslim candidate was 
acceptable.  Hard-line Islamic groups incited major 
protests, where they accused Ahok of blasphemy and 
“demand[ed] that he be jailed or executed.”  AR 470.  
Under extreme public pressure, Indonesian police 
ultimately arrested Ahok for blasphemy, for which he 
was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
two years in prison.  Although this is a specific and 
singular incident of use of the country’s blasphemy 
laws against a Christian, a few of the exhibits supplied 
by Liem indicate that Ahok’s conviction is “symbolic 
of rising religious intolerance in Indonesia.”  AR 456.  
Others show that the incident has borne increased 
public hostility against ethnically Chinese Indonesians.  
See AR 554 (“The movement against [Ahok] . . . has 
overflowed with racial slurs against his Chinese 
ancestry, an unnerving sign in a country with a history 
of lashing out violently against the ethnic minority.”); 
AR 521 (“[O]penly anti-Chinese speeches at the anti-
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Ahok rallies and growing racism on social media have 
many ethnic Chinese concerned.  There is even talk 
among some about leaving the country if the 
government does not provide the necessary security.”); 
AR 561 (“The campaign against [Ahok] has since taken 
on anti-Chinese overtones.”).  This hostility is, in some 
ways, “unprecedented.”  AR 511 (“Muslim clerics have 
launched a campaign to deny proper burial rights to 
deceased Muslims who had voted for Ahok . . . .”). 
 Some exhibits demonstrate an increase in enforcement 
of Indonesia’s blasphemy laws.  See AR 501 (stating 
that between 2005 and 2017, no one charged with 
blasphemy was acquitted, and implying that some of 
those charged prior to 2005 had been acquitted); AR 
446–47 (reporting that accusations similar to those that 
Ahok was charged with were levied against another 
Christian politician). 
 Others discuss the very recent use of caning as a 
punishment for non-Muslims.  It was applied against a 
non-Muslim—in that case, a Christian—for the first 
time in April of 2016.  Since then, it has been applied 
against non-Muslims two more times. 
 A number of exhibits point to “the [recent] 
mainstreaming of extremist positions.”  AR 443; see 
also AR 506 (“The coalescing of an Islamic vote is a 
surprisingly new development in a political scene that 
has always been dominated by secular parties.”); AR 
492 (“Some Indonesians are concerned by what they 
perceive is the ‘Arabization’ or ‘creeping Islamization’ 
of the country’s more pluralistic form of Islam.”). 
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By failing to address these exhibits—let alone merely 
acknowledge them—the BIA contravened our mandate that it 
show that it considered the entire evidentiary record, see 
Zheng, 549 F.3d at 269–70 (remanding because the BIA 
“fail[ed] to discuss most of the evidentiary record” for both 
petitioners), and clearly did not fulfill its heightened duty to 
“consider any country conditions evidence submitted by 
[Liem] that materially bears on his claim,” id. at 268 (quoting 
Guo, 463 F.3d at 115) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To 
be sure, the BIA was not required to cite to every exhibit 
provided by Liem.  However, given the strength of the 
abovementioned evidence in favor of Liem’s position, it was 
required to meaningfully account for it in some way. 
 
 The fact that the First Circuit has suggested that 
conditions for Christians in Indonesia have materially changed 
since 2006 and that there has been “an especially sharp increase 
in governmental and private persecution of Indonesian 
Christians between 2014 and 2017” also gives us pause.  
Sihotang, 900 F.3d at 53.  The Government attempts to 
distinguish Sihotang, arguing that its holding rested on the 
BIA’s failure to evaluate the petitioner’s claim as one of 
changed country conditions for evangelical Christians rather 
than Christians who practice their faith privately.  The 
Government urges that because Liem did not argue that he is 
an evangelical Christian for whom proselytizing is a 
requirement, Sihotang is not on point.  But the Government’s 
view of Sihotang and the facts here is too narrow.  As noted 
above, the Court’s ruling in Sihotang rested in large measure 
on the changed country conditions in Indonesia for all 
Christians.  See id. at 51–52.  Moreover, to the extent its ruling 
rested on the distinction between those who practice their faith 
privately and those who practice publicly, there is evidence 
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here that Liem’s faith may involve a similarly public 
component.  In his second motion to reopen, Liem submitted a 
letter from his pastor stating that he is a deacon in his church 
who “takes care of [] church services” and “meet[s] the needs 
of the people in the community.”  AR 80.  This was reinforced 
by letters provided by several parishioners.  The Government 
did not dispute these facts.  Therefore, the increase in religious 
intolerance in Indonesia reflected in the record might be 
“uniquely problematic” for Liem, since he is a minister in his 
community, thus practicing his Christian faith publicly.  
Sihotang, 900 F.3d at 53.  Moreover, in light of the decisions 
rendered by the BIA member in this case after Sihotang was 
published, we question whether the BIA would have a view of 
this case now that differs from its view of the record eleven 
months ago.  See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 315 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“Administrative agencies must apply the same 
basic rules to all similarly situated supplicants.” (quoting 
Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
  
In sum, the BIA “appears to have completely 
overlooked critical evidence” when it failed to explain how it 
reached its conclusion and failed to even acknowledge 
evidence contrary to its position in both the exhibits it cited and 
those it did not cite.  Sihotang, 900 F.3d at 51.  Under our 
precedent, these deficiencies constituted an abuse of 
discretion.10 
                                              
10 In his petition for review, Liem also argues that he 
established a prima facie case for withholding of removal.  
Because the BIA did not reach this issue, we refrain from 
addressing it in the first instance.  See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 
537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (per curiam). 
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IV. 
 Because the BIA did not explain its conclusion and did 
not meaningfully consider much of the evidence presented by 
Liem, we will grant his petition for review, vacate the denial of 
his second motion to reopen, and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In doing so, we do 
not decide whether Liem has shown materially changed 
conditions in Indonesia warranting reopening of his removal 
proceedings.  Rather, we conclude that the abovementioned 
evidence contradicting the BIA’s determination is strong 
enough to require the BIA to afford it more thorough 
consideration.  We remand for the BIA to meet its heightened 
duty and meaningfully consider all of the evidence, which may 
or may not yield a different result. 
